Showing posts with label Stock Investments. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Stock Investments. Show all posts

Stock Portfolio and Watch List Update for July 2012


Following are the activity from the previous month:

a)      Closed the following longs: Sold CPFL Energia (CPL), Citigroup (C), and Walmart (WMT) at profits of 4.92%, 7.21%, and 34.94% respectively. The sales had a combined portfolio impact of 0.86%.
b)      Increased/Added the following longs: Added one-third more to our holdings in Nokia (NOK) on 07/19/2012 at $1.82.
c)      Long Calls: None.
d)     Long Puts: None.
e)      Shorts: None.
f)       Short Calls: Closed short calls on Quality Systems (Sep 2012 45), Gold Miners ETF (GDX Jan 2013 59), Alcoa (AA Jan 2013 12.5), Nucor (NUE July 2012 43), Intel Corp (Oct 2012 27), and Microsoft (Aug 2012 31) for modest gains for a combined portfolio impact was 0.65%. We also established short calls against our entire Nucor long pong position (NUE Oct 2012 40 @ $1.1).
g)      Short Puts: Closed short puts on Apple (Sep 2012 550), CVI Energy (CVI Dec 2012 25), and Procter & Gamble (PG Jan 2013 57.5) for modest gains for a combined portfolio impact of 0.27%. We still have the CVI Energy 25 long calls open. So, the net effect of that transaction was conversion of the synthetic long position to a long call position. We also established short puts on Apple (Oct 2012 560 @ $22.60) on 7/3/2012 and Nucor (Jan 2013 34 @ $2.20) on 7/12/2012.
h)      Synthetic Longs: The Corning long calls (Jan 2014 12) were converted to synthetic longs by establishing short puts with the same expiry & strike price. The net cash outlay of the transactions stand at ~0.1% of portfolio.
i)        Synthetic Shorts: None.

The cash position in our portfolio is at about 36%.

Long/Short Portfolio Update:



The overall portfolio is 4.34% down compared to our cost-basis.

2012 Transactions Summary:



Excluding dividends, we have a realized gain of 11.01% in the portfolio YTD.

Option Position Updates:

Short Puts: Apple (AAPL Oct 2012 560 @ 22.60), ABB Ltd (ABB Dec 2012 15 @ 0.65), Quality Systems (QSII Dec 2012 30 @ 2.15), and Nucor (NUE Jan 2013 34 @ 2.20). The short puts together have a cash coverage requirement of about 40.5% of our cash position.

Short Calls: Itron (ITRI Aug 2012 40 at $4.20), Alcoa (AA Jan 2013 12.5 at $0.64), Dryships (DRYS Jan 2013 2.5 at $0.65), Clearwire (CLWR Jan 2013 1.5 at 0.35), and Nucor (NUE Oct 2012 40 at $1.10). The short call exposure is ~5% of the portfolio.

Long Calls: CVI Energy (CVI Dec 2012 25 @ 2.10).

Synthetic Longs: JC Penney (JCP Jan 2014 25) and Corning (GLW Jan 2014 12) with a net exposure of ~4% of portfolio and ~10% of cash.

Watch List: Assured Guaranty Limited (AGO), Air Products & Chemicals (APD), Bemis Company (BMS), Canon (CAJ), Dell Inc (DELL), Diageo (DEO), Emerson Electric (EMR), Forest Laboratories (FRX), Gafisa SA (GFA), Bank of Ireland (IRE), Jefferies Group (JEF), McGraw Hill (MHP), 3M Company (MMM), NovaGold (NG), Nestle (NSRGY), PepsiCo (PEP), State Auto Financial (STFC), Teva Pharmaceuticals (TEVA), Vivendi (VIVHY), and Whirlpool (WHR).

Quick Take on Procter & Gamble (PG)

Fair Value Estimates (FVE):


Click for an intro on our Fair Value Estimates. Below is our estimates for Procter & Gamble:


The average FVE is $65.12 against the current share price of ~$67.50.


Financials Summary:


 


Q2 2012 Quarter Report & Conf. Call – 01/27/2012:



Organic sales growth – 4%, volume – 1%: effect of pricing.

 No growth in developed markets. But, developing markets at 37% of sales compared to 27% of sales 5 years ago is offsetting this factor well.

Market share in line or higher in businesses representing ~45% of global sales compared to 60% level in previous quarters – negative effect of price increases – expects it to be temporary as price gaps narrow either because of competitors following price increases or PG dropping the price increase. But, global market share inline with prior year levels – held or grew share in 9 of 15 countries, 3 of 6 reporting segments and 11 of 24 billion-dollar brands.

Core earnings down 3% due to higher commodity prices and tax rate headwind. Also, divestiture of PUR business had an impact.

Good and intangibles write-down at $0.53 per share – onetime non-cash – appliances and salon professional businesses – out period growth projection reduced.  Tax rate at 36.7% due to the noncore nature of charges which are not tax deductible. Otherwise it should have been 24.9%.


Six Reporting Segments Summary:



  1. Beauty Segment: organic volume and sales growth of 2%. Retail hair care led the growth with India Pantene shipments increasing 80% and China Head & Shoulders shipments increasing 25%. NA weak – mid-single digit shipment decline.
  2. Grooming segment: Blades and razors volume increased low single digits. CEE, ME, and Africa shipments in double digits mainly from expansion of Fusion ProGlide. NA Fusion ProGlide sales offset by Mach3 losses.
  3. Health Care Segment: Oral care volume down low single digits. Crest 3D White growing. Oral-B toothpaste expansion markets delivered results ahead of expectation.
  4. Fabric and Home Care Segment: Organic sales growth of 5% - flat volume. Tide PODS should start selling in less than a month. It could become the biggest launch in the US consumer product industry.
  5. Global Home Care Segment: Shipments up low single digits. Challenge – US auto dish category were price was increased 8% - the consumer value versus competitive products currently outside our range and so we will reverse some of the price increases – to aggressively pursue cost savings to maintain profitability.
  6. Baby and Family Care Segment: Organic sales up 6% - mainly because of price increase. Focus on strong 3-tiered portfolio.

Guidance:


Background - Tightened sales guidance and earning per share guidance mainly because of foreign exchange impact – ruble, zloty, the real, the peso, and the Turkish lira depreciated 10% to 20% against the dollar. These along with pound sterling have caused the majority of earnings impact. Historically, currency impact is offset by declining commodity costs which has not been true so far – input costs still expected to be $1.8B higher.  Developed markets all weak with US being the only one growing, albeit slowly. Disproportionate growth in developing markets also has an impact as absolute profit per unit is lower in the area.

Priorities

  1. Maintaining our top line growth momentum – 4% organic sales growth is good, 
  2. Execute pricing changes with excellence. Some corrections, but they are minor compared to $3.5B in increases this year. Pricing to continue to be a significant driver of organic sales growth, 
  3. Improving productivity – Reducing number of technical centers we operate globally while opening new ones in developing markets – facility in Singapore and R&D center in Beijing – operating closer to growth areas. Overhead to be reduced by 1600 roles through selective hiring, normal attrition, and restructuring. To announce more at CAGNY. 
  4. Restore solid operating profit growth – pricing should help – second half core operating profit growth to be 10 to 15%.

Guidance Summary – core earnings guided down to $4 to $4.10 from the prior range of $4.15 to $4.33. So, EPS growth to be 1% to 4% compared to $3.95 in prior year. All-in earnings per share in the $3.85 to $4.08 range – includes $0.55 to $0.65 per share gain from Pringles divestiture, restructuring cost in the range of $0.15 to $0.80 per share and $0.52 per share in non-core charges related to impairments, etc. Capital spending in the 4-5% range. Expect to pay $6B in dividends and $4-5B in share repurchases.

Jan-Mar quarter guidance – organic sales growth in the 3-5% range – compared to 4-9% projected for the back half. But, foreign exchange expected to have negative impact of 3 points resulting in flat to 2% sales growth range.


Q2 2012 Conference Call Q&A Summary:



Second year in a row were you project back end loaded guidance only to retract. What gives?

Productivity increase is a focus. To talk more about this in CAGNY. Top-line is growing. Bottom line is a function of macro effects. We will try to offset with productivity increases. But, we can’t reduce spending to offset costs as that will harm our long-term trajectory.

Pricing flexibility – please comment?

Overall successful in executing the pricing increases. There are 3 exceptions were we had to take action. The percentage increase this time around is much less and so it should be asier to implement. Also, commodities  rolled over last time with our price increases. That is not likely to happen this time. Besides, we are growing share now.

How is growth projected – volume vs pricing?

We will continue to grow top line and we are going to continue to grow the market share. The strategy is to have a full portfolio of offerings from premium priced to low priced. Example is laundry care currently – Tide total care at the premium end, Tide at the average end, to Era at the low end. PODS is the new innovation in the area. Crest 3D white is another premium priced example. Innovation at the premium end is critical.

Volume will be a bigger component going forward. Out of 4 to 5 top line, 3 to 4 points will be volume – mix and pricing help.

Discontinuous innovation by – growing categories. Not seeing that. Why?

You should be seeing it. Febreze auto product is an example – gets us into a category in fragrances in automobiles that we have never been in before. Tide PODS is another example – it will be expansive to the laundry category – it’s the most condensed laundry product you can buy – much better for environment – it is expected to be 30% of category.

Cost cutting needs to happen faster. Also, its just too complex and needs to be broken up – what is your take?

Scale is a tremendous advantage. Wants to be in the top-third in peer group w.r.t. total shareholder returns. Improving productivity is part of the deal – you will hear more at CAGNY. We have been doing similar to what Kraft did. The key question is whether we can scale and win versus the more focused company and we think the answer is Yes.

Cost savings and role of advertising related question?

Over time, advertising cost increases should moderate – more choices, less expensive in the digital space.


Macro Assessment:



Global economic growth is a big positive for the company. Strong dollar is a negative.


Checklist:


1.        Is it a business I understand very well squarely within my circle of competence? – somewhat.
2.        Do I know the intrinsic value of the business today with a high degree of confidence? – somewhat.
3.        Is the business priced at a large discount to intrinsic value today and in two to three years? – No, FVE showed it being fairly valued.
4.        Would I be willing to invest a large portion of my net worth into this business? – No.
5.        Is the downside minimal? – may be – beta is low at 0.30 – so it should hold up very well in a correction.
6.        Does the business have a moat? – may be – many of its products are household names and so there is a certain level of user loyalty.
7.        Is the business run by able and honest managers? – may be – compensation is very high.
8.        How much is the Margin of Safety? – A good investment needs good downside protection – margin of safety is very low but (~$65 was our average FVE). beta is very low as well and so there is some downside protection.
9.         Moats – A good investment needs to have a good upside earnings engine. Is there a solid moat? Could the moat be shrinking/evaporating? – see above.
10.    Is it a simple easy to understand business? – somewhat. 
11.    Are the revenues and cash flows of the business sustainable? Are you looking at normalized earnings or boom-time earnings? – Example Cort Furniture purchase by Wesco – the volumes were high due to Internet bubble – Buffett/Munger mistake. Given the complexity of the business, it is tough to gauge – it appears we are looking at normalized earnings.
12.    Is it a Graham Net/Net play? – Bought below net working capital. Special Situation – good downside protection and chance of high returns, but probability is very low - Cash and short-term investments + (0.75 * accounts receivable) + (0.5 * inventory) - total liabilities. No – big negative number.
13.    Is the company’s business becoming unregulated? – that could cause the moat to quickly evaporate  - regulated businesses have high cost structures which would be disastrous in a competitive unregulated landscape – an example of such a mistake is Warren Buffet’s investment in US Air which he acknowledged as a mistake in the 1996 letter to shareholders. No.
14.    Assets to Equity – Is the company too leveraged? – the ratio is at ~200% - so, the company is leveraged - good will and intangibles make up roughly half of the assets.
15.    Could the company have made bad lending decisions? – bank specific – NA.
16.    How much will high unemployment and recession hurt the business? – it will affect the company negatively.
17.    Is the investment correlated to one or more of your existing holdings? – holding many business that are correlated can result in an undiversified portfolio – Yes – KFT is in the same general area (consumer products conglomerate), but it is splitting up – after the split-up, will have to reassess..
18.    Can this business be decimated by low-cost competition from China or other low-cost countries? – example – Warren Buffett’s investment in Dexter Shoes – No. But, private-label is a threat.
19.    Is this a win-win business for the entire ecosystem? – avoids tobacco, gambling, predatory lenders, etc –Yes.
20.    Mohnish Pabrai has said he has ten check-list questions on leverage – How much?, What are the covenants? Are they recourse or non-recourse?, etc. – Not clear.
21.    There are five questions on management - Management Compensation? Interests of Management – Is it aligned with shareholders? Management’s historical track-record?, Does Management have a large stake in the company? – Very little insider ownership.
22.    Unions & collective bargaining issues related questions – Does the company have union issues? – don’t know.
23.    Pension funding status? – unfunded amount is pretty high - ~$11B.


 

Quick Take:



As a huge conglomerate, the company is very complex – there are myriad factors that affect the company that one needs to consider to analyze it well. On a pure fundamental basis, the company has a TTM PE of 17.05 and because of the anemic guidance; the projected forward PE is down only by a small amount to 16.5. The PE is comparable to companies in its peer group.

Our average Fair Value Estimate (FVE) came in at $65.15, only a slight discount to the current price of $67.43. Financials show a healthy picture with a couple of concerns: Asset to Equity ratio is high at ~200% indicating a fair amount of leverage and the Graham Net-Net is a large negative number, again indicative of the large leverage.

The company has a focus on productivity & cost savings and has a plan to realize ~$10B in productivity and cost savings by 2016. It includes a target of ~$3B in overhead reduction. The savings has to come from a projected $85B cost pool for 2016 that includes $52.1B in COGS and $32.8B in SG&A. The projected savings account for 12% of the projected cost pool and that level of savings is easier said than done. But, if the company is able to pull off this, earnings-per-share could double based on this factor alone, within the next 4 years. Investing in the company at the current price level is a bet that the company’s management will be able to deliver on this objective.

Last Updated: 03/2012. 


Media disservice– CNN Coverage of Berkshire Hathaway’s new stake in Dollar General (DG)

CNN Money ran an article on 08/15/11 titled “Buffet Adds $58 Million Stake in Dollar General” with the opening line “If you want to invest like Warren Buffett, start by adding Dollar General to your portfolio and offloading shares of Kraft”. Anyone glancing at the headline and the first lines would gather Warren Buffet to be mighty bullish on Dollar General and bearish on Kraft. The complete truth however went largely missing. There is no denying $58 million is a solid chunk of change – but it pales in comparison to Buffet’s investment portfolio size which towers at over $115 Billion (~$48B Cash, ~$67B Equity). This brings the value of the new stake in Dollar General to be just 0.05% of his total investments. It is also a fact that Buffet bid adieu to six million shares of Kraft during the second quarter. The article conveniently omitted to mention that his remaining stake of 99.5 Million Shares of Kraft is valued at around $3.5 Billion which is around 3% of the value of his total investments. The naked truth is that Berkshire Hathaway’s current stake in Kraft is valued at over sixty times the value of his new Dollar General stake. The article naively implies getting rid of Kraft and buying Dollar General is a sure bet to be an investor like Buffet.

Rather than quoting large numbers, let us cut to the chase and compare how changes in the share price of Dollar General and Kraft will impact Berkshire Hathaway’s overall portfolio value. The task at hand is to have a 1% impact on Berkshire Hathaway’s investment portfolio, and for that the overall portfolio value has to increase or decrease by around $1.15B. The table below shows how Dollar General’s (DG) and Kraft’s (KFT) stock prices should move to have the 1% impact on Berkshire Hathaway’s portfolio:













Stock Berkshire Hathaway Holdings ValueCurrent Price per ShareProjected Price Per Share for 1% Performance Imapct
Dollar General (DG)$58M$32.19$670.44
Kraft (KFT)$3.5B$34.68$46.07


Dollar General’s price per share has to go up to $670.44 from the current share price of $32.19 for Berkshire Hathaway’s Dollar General Holdings to have a 1% positive performance impact on the overall portfolio. By the same token Kraft’s price per share only needs to go up from $34.68 to $46.07 to have the same impact. To summarize, the CNN articles’ premise is completely misleading - the portfolio adjustments in the second quarter 2011 are very minor compared to the overall portfolio size to warrant any such judgment call. Furthermore, Berkshire Hathaway’s 2nd quarter 2011 adjustments may have nothing to do with Warren Buffet’s stock selection. It is highly likely that the Dollar General (DG) pick was by Todd Combs, the hedge fund manager Buffet tapped in late 2010, as the amount involved is comparatively little. While the article by CNN Money did a disservice to the investing community, articles from Bloomberg and Morningstar did convey reputable information. Readers can also find the information by comparing Berkshire Hathaway’s latest 13F SEC filing with their previous filing.

Demand Media (DMD) - Stock Analysis

Introduction:

Demand Media (DMD), launched with $120M in venture capital funding, is an online media company founded in May 2006 by Shawn Colo and Richard Rosenblatt. Colo was a private equity investor while Rosenblatt was chairman of MySpace before launching Demand Media. The business plan revolved around purchasing generic domain names (not trademarked), adding low-cost content, and increasing advertisement revenue. The combination worked wonders with Colo focusing on M&A transactions and Rosenblatt on operations. Globally, parked generic sites whose only content were ads that linked to other sites accounted for between 5 and 10% of search-engine revenue at the time. DMD’s plan was to convert these billboards into content websites that would be capable of generating even more ad-revenue once relevant content is incorporated and updated on a periodic basis. To achieve this objective, DMD made a number of acquisitions early on. Chief among them were:
  1. eHow (5/’06): An online how-to guide with over a million articles and 170,000 videos created by freelancers.
  2. eNom (5/’06): A domain name registrar. Two months later, its competitor BulkRegister was also acquired. The combined entity is second only to GoDaddy.com.
  3. Hillclimb Media (8/’06): Hosted sites such as Trails.com and GolfLink.com.
  4. AnswerBag.com (10/’06): Q&A website driven by user questions and answers.
  5. Non-MySpace assets of Intermix Network LLC (parent of MySpace) from Fox Interactive Media (FIM) (11/’06): Portfolio of 20 sites including grab.com and a perpetual license (royalty free) to use grab.com code-base. Later (12/’09), the grab.com related assets were sold to Grab LLC.
  6. ExpertVillage.com (6/’07): ‘How-to’ professional videos on a large array of topics. ExpertVillage was owned by PageWise.
By March 2008, the company had taken in $355M after four rounds of venture capital funding. Aquistion pattern underwent a makeover around 3/2008 during their effort to morph into a few other areas. Chief among them were:
  1. pluck.com (3/’08): A developer of social media tools. The company’s social media technology platform is used in over 375 leading brands including the NFL, Best Buy, and Kraft.
  2. CoveritLive (3/’11): A live event platform company that allows businesses to interact with customers in real-time by streaming live coverage and social engagement. Since ’09, DMD had held a minority interest in the company.
DMD held its Initial Public Offering (IPO) on Jan 26, 2011 and raised over $150M, bringing the valuation of the company to around $1.5B. However, in the few months since, the shares have performed dismally returning a loss of 40%.

Business Issues:

Demand Media (DMD) has never been profitable. The losses showed an increasing loss trend from 2007 to 2009, where the net loss went from around $6M in ‘07 to around $22M in ’09. This trend was contained to a certain degree in 2010 with a net loss of $5M. In the first quarter following its IPO in 2011, the company reported a net loss of $5.58M. Its IPO was delayed, as the company discussed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on how to clarify to investors its approach for expensing the cost of creating its content. DMD’s S-1 filing stated that the capitalized media content is amortized on a straight-line basis over five years. This is an aggressive type of accounting, as companies in the publishing business generally account for content creation costs as they are incurred. DMD’s defense is that its content is more evergreen – how-to articles have a longer shelf-life compared to news and other mass-media articles from Ad revenue point of view. SEC allowed this after mandating DMD use their algorithmic platform to provide proof of probable economic benefits of the content over the 5-year amortization period. On the other hand, the straight-line accounting method seems an approximation at best as the economic benefit of five-year old content can never equal the economic benefit at the time of publication - search engines invariably rank newer content higher. However the company can most certainly derive economic benefits from older articles (more than 5 years), provided they invest albeit lightly to keep the articles up-to-date and apply SEO techniques on a regular basis.

Demand Media’s Registrar business eNom is a mature entity in spite of the healthy revenue growth rate in recent years. The idea with this acquisition was to derive synergistic benefits with its content and media entity. To realize synergies, DMD has focused on mining proprietary data available from hosted sites and providing access to new sources of traffic. The competitive advantage these carry allows them to offer low pricing on domain registrations. This partly explains its vigorous growth rate in that area recently, as indicated below:



However, as the registrar business has very low barriers to entry, it is considered a very low-margin business. Going forward, it will be harder for DMD to show healthy growth rates in this business unit.

Currently DMD’s content and media business relies heavily on algorithms that analyze the search criteria to identify content topics with a good return on investment (ROI). The concept boils down to spotting “commercially-viable” long-tail searches, and writing optimized content that ranks high in search engines. Those searches with higher specificity generate more Ad revenue compared to less specific searches. A logical conclusion that can be deducted from this model is that the business is sensitive to changes in search engine algorithms. Search engines frequently alter their algorithms, although major ones happen only once every few months. SEO businesses are generally nimble at adapting, but there is no guarantee search-engine rankings will remain consistent over periods of time. The issue is very real as demonstrated by the following graph showing the global percentage reach statistics for the company’s premium site eHow:




The reach went down by close to 15% in the last month following changes to Google’s search algorithm (nicknamed Panda). The initial Panda updates made in February had a short-term positive impact but the final changes in mid-April resulted in an almost immediate negative effect. In the last 45-days, there has not been much improvement to the reach either, begging the question as to whether SEO tricks will facilitate sites holding on to their high rankings.

Demand Media’s content and media business exploits the inefficiencies at both ends of its “supply-chain”. They algorithmically determine the required content based on demand from search data and engage a large author base to provide content at low cost. DMD’s ‘on-demand content generation’ strategy gives them a near-term competitive lead as the majority of content in the Internet is devoid of such techniques. At the supply end are authors who are mostly freelancers used to getting minimal pay for their efforts. With the proliferation of blogs and wikis, the market has a large base of ‘decent’ writers used to contributing content to wikis and/or blogs without remuneration. So, the universal thinking is – any money for such services is good. As with most transformative businesses in the early stages, the processes in place to generate content using freelancers are constantly changing. The promise of DMD is to have a structure in place for this chaotic environment by grading writers objectively whereby pay is commensurate with the quality of the content. Once such a system is established, the limiting factor is the availability of commercially viable content. This is a big unknown, as DMD does not disclose details on the commercially viable content in its pipeline. Demand Media has hundreds of thousands of articles waiting to be written but it is unclear whether they can increase production of new articles while also increasing profitability.

Finances:

The table below summarizes Demand Media’s financial position:


Year200820092010
Revenue170.25M198.45M252.94M
Net Loss(43.11M)(53.32M)(38.58M)
Shares Outstanding8.18M11.16M13.51M
Loss per Share (Normalized – one-time items removed)(5.27)(4.78)(2.86)
YOY Earnings GrowthNA9.30%40.17%
YOY Revenue GrowthNA16.56%27.46%
Net Profit Margin(25.32)%(26.87)%(15.25)%

Although Demand Media shows an accelerating trend in terms of both revenue and earnings growth, they still have quite a distance to cover to attain profitability. The accelerating trend needs to be sustained for a few years for the company’s current enterprise value to be justified.

Quantitative Rating:

The spreadsheet below shows our quantitative rating summary of Demand Media (click for an understanding of the ratings on this spreadsheet):

 

Demand Media scores 0/10 on its ability to beat inflation: Return on Equity, Net Profit Margin, and Free Cash Flow are all negative. PEG ratio, a measure of valuation is very rich at 2.28.

Corporate Abuse rating is 0/10 as their executive compensation is egregious: The CEO makes around $26.8M, around 500 times the average worker.

Income generation and liquidity measure is average at 6.33/10: Demand Media does not pay a dividend. The stock is also optionable. Liquidity is good at 436,473 average in daily volume.

Volatility ranking is below average at 3.33/10: the company has no debt, Beta is not determined, and the company has never been profitable.

Capacity to increase dividends scored 0/10: Demand Media pays no dividends and has never been profitable.

The overall quantitative rating or the ‘OFB Factor’ came in at 1.93/10, which is pretty dismal.

Summary:

Demand Media has an enterprise value of $1.02B and a forward PE of 34.27. Its revenue grew almost 22% on average in the last 3 years. The company plans to achieve revenue growth in the 25% range and is predicted to become profitable as early as the coming quarter. Analysts paint a rosy picture with earnings of 0.27 in the coming year accelerating at a 60% rate in the next year to 0.43. These projections are aggressive and seeing is believing on what the company can actually achieve.

The company has the chance to be a dominant player in the demand-based content creation business. Further, its freelance content creation model has the potential to tap a largely unexploited pool of respectable writers to generate commercially viable content. However it is unclear whether the company can continue to find content topics that are commercially viable while increasing profit margins perpetually.

Demand Media has a PEG ratio of 2.28, which indicates that the valuation is high. Our quantitative analysis showed a dismal rating for the company. As the valuation is high, and growth projections are aggressive, we do not recommend purchasing Demand Media stock at this time.

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